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Abstract. The MOR cryptosystem [9] is a natural generalization of the
El-Gamal cryptosystem to non-abelian groups. Using a p-group, a cryp-
tosystem was built in [4]. It seems resoanable to assume the cryptosystem
is as secure as the El-Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields. A natural
question arises can one make a better cryptosystem using p-groups? In
this paper we show that the answer is no.
1 Introduction
There are three cryptosystems widely in use today – 1) RSA 2) The El-
Gamal or the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol over the group of
points on a Elliptic curve over a finite field; also known as the Ellip-
tic curve cryptosystems and 3) The El-Gamal or the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol over the multiplicative group of a finite field. The secu-
rity type of the RSA and the El-Gamal or the Diffie-Hellman over finite
fields is the same. The best known attack against them, the index calculus
methods, is sub-exponential in nature. On the other hand, the best known
attack against the Elliptic curve cryptosystems is exponential in nature.
This is the primary difference of Elliptic curve cryptosystems from others.
This is a very loose but effective distinction between cryptosystems.
It is natural to ask the question, can we build some other cryptosys-
tem for which the security is exponential too, as in the Elliptic curve
cryptosystems? The quest for an answer to the above question led us to
look at MOR [9] and p-groups as in [4]. In [4] we showed that it is pos-
sible to build a cryptosystem which is as secure as the El-Gamal over
finite fields, i.e., is of sub-exponential type. In this paper we show that
is the best possible scenario when we are working with MOR over finite
p-groups.
2 The MOR cryptosystem
Let G be a group and φ : G → G be an automorphism. In this paper, if
we work with automorphisms of G, we work in the automorphism group
of G, with the group operation being the composition of automorphisms
as mappings.
2.1 Description of the MOR cryptosystem
Alice’s keys are as follows:
Public Key φ and φm, m ∈ N.
Private Key m.
Encryption
a To send a message a ∈ G Bob computes φr and φmr for a random
r ∈ N.
b The ciphertext is (φr, φmr(a)).
Decryption
a Alice knows m, so if she receives the ciphertext (φr, φmr(a)), she com-
putes φmr from φr and then φ−mr and then from φmr(a) computes
a.
Alice can compute φ−mr two ways; if she has the information necessary
to find out the order of the automorphism φ then she can use the identity
φt−1 = φ−1 whenever φt = 1. Also, she can find out the order of some
subgroup in which φ belongs and use the same identity. However the
smaller the subgroup, more efficient the decryption algorithm.
3 The MOR cryptosystem using linear operators of
vector spaces over finite fields
Let us consider the MOR cryptosystem on a finite dimensional vector
space V over a finite field Fq, where q = p
k; p is a prime and k a positive
integer. This means that in place of G in Section 2.1; we are using a vector
space V and in place of the automorphism φ : G → G, we are using a
linear transformation φ : V → V . We want to understand the security of
this MOR, this is not only of academic interest [6] but also of future need
in this paper.
It is well known [10, Chapter 2] that if we fix a basis for a n-dimensional
vector space V over Fq, then corresponding to a linear operator T : V → V
there is a n × n matrix A over Fq such that T (x) = Ax for all x ∈ V .
Furthermore T n(x) = Anx, i.e., exponentiation of the map T is the same
as the exponentiation of the matrix A. Furthermore, notice that in MOR
the homomorphisms assumed are automorphisms, so the matrix A is in-
vertible. Hence we claim that the discrete logarithm problem in the group
of linear operators over a vector space V is the same as the discrete loga-
rithm problem in GL(n, q), the group of n×n non-singular matrices over
Fq. We simultaneously claim that this provides sufficient evidence to claim
that the MOR cryptosystem on the group of linear operators is the same
and has the same security as a El-Gamal cryptosystem over GL(n, q).
The next is to show that the discrete logarithm problem over GL(n, q) is
only as secure as the discrete logarithm problem over some finite exten-
sion of Fq. This was actually proved in [6]. So, we claim that if we are
using the MOR cryptosystem on linear operators over vector spaces then
there is no advantage to be gained in terms of security and since matrix
multiplication is harder to compute than that of integer multiplication,
we see that there are no practical advantages as well.
4 The MOR cryptosystem using p-groups
The non-abelian p-groups are a very nice candidate for the MOR cryp-
tosystem; because computation is easy with them and there are a lot of
p-groups, see [12]. A lot is known about the p-groups and it seems that
one might be able to use them to build a good and secure cryptosystem
using MOR. This was the motivation behind [4], to consider the group of
unitriangular matrices over finite fields for MOR. The MOR cryptosys-
tem over the group of unitriangular matrices was successful in the sense
that it is as secure as the El-Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields; it
would be nicer if a “more secure”, i.e., an exponential type cryptosys-
tem could be built using other p-groups. This means that we are trying
to build cryptosystems in which the best known attack has exponential
time computational complexity, viz. the elliptic curve cryptosystem; not
RSA or the cryptosystems using the discrete logarithm problem in finite
fields; where sub-exponential time attacks are known.
In this paper we show that it is impossible to do that when we are
using finite p-groups and the MOR cryptosystem; more specifically we
show that if we are working with finite p-groups the best attack can
always be reduced to an attack on the discrete logarithm problem over
finite fields.
For this we define the Frattini subgroup of a finite group G.
Definition 1. [11, Chapter 5]
If G is a group, then its Frattini subgroup Φ(G) is the defined as the
intersection of all maximal subgroups of G.
It is well known that Φ(G) is a characteristic subgroup and hence a normal
subgroup of G. We now state without proof the following well known
theorem.
Theorem 1. [11, Theorem 5.48]
Let G be a finite group.
(i) Φ(G) is nilpotent.
(ii) If G is a finite p-group, then Φ(G) = G′Gp, where Gp is the subgroup
of G generated by all pth power and G′ is the derived subgroup of G.
(iii) If G is a finite p-group then G/Φ(G) is a vector space over Zp
We are interested in part(iii) of the above theorem. This theorem is the
basis of the Burnside basis theorem [11, Theorem 5.40], which guarantees
a fixed cardinality for any set of minimal generators for a finite p-group.
Now let us think of the MOR cryptosystem as in Section 2.1 where G
is a finite p-group. Since Φ(G) is characteristic, hence corresponding to an
automorphism φ : G→ G there is a map φ′ : G/Φ(G)→ G/Φ(G). Now φ′
is a linear operator of the vector space G/Φ(G) over Zp. As we saw in the
earlier section, MOR over linear transformations is only as secure as the
El-Gamal cryptosystem over finite fields. So, we conclude that the MOR
over finite p-groups is also only as secure as the El-Gamal cryptosystem
over finite fields.
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